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1 Introduction1
This article traces the historical evolution of BOP
(balance of payments) support from Norway, and
discusses policy and other guidelines for such aid,
the importance of BOF support in total Norwegian
aid and the main recipients of this aid. It is partly
based on an analysis of the evaluation methodology
adopted by six evaluations and project reviews, and
assesses what can be learnt from those studies
about the economic impact of BOF support.
The familiar argument in favour of foreign aid is
that it comes in addition to the recipient country's
domestic saving and its own foreign exchange
earnings, and thus allows that country to increase
its level of investment, without being hindered by
foreign exchange shortages, and consequently
boost its growth rate and economic and social
development. However, empirical studies have
revealed that in many developing countries the
impact has not been as expected, inter alta because
foreign aid in many cases has led to reduced
domestic savings. Such studies are controversial,
e.g. White's criticism of them (White 1992 and
1994). Attempts to evaluate the macroeconomic
impact of parts of the foreign aid, viz, in this case
of commodity import support (CIS), will necessar-
ily be as difficult to undertake in a convincing way
as are studies of the impact of total aid, not least
because CIS basically is the most fungible part of
foreign aid.
2 Norwegian Balance of
Payments Support
Norwegian balance of payments support has tradi-
tionally taken the form of commodity import sup-
port, broken down in two components:
commodity assistance which was administered by
NORAD, and import support which was handled
by the recipient country Goods under commodity
assistance were purchased and paid for by the
Norwegian aid administration, and in practice
most were bought in Norway, on the condition that
the unit price should not exceed the price at which
the commodity could be procured elsewhere by
more than 10 per cent. Much of the commodity
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assistance consisted of traditional, presumably
internationally competitive, Norwegian export
products such as fertilisers and non-ferrous metals,
but there were exceptions. Import support was han-
dled by the recipient countries themselves and
could, in general, only be used for purchases in
other developing countries, or Norway
Both forms of commodity import support involved
negotiations between the two governments on
which goods should be imported under the pro-
grammes. This arrangement often led to delays in
disbursements as some parts of the agreed alloca-
tions remained unutilized, and new negotiations
had to be undertaken to select other types of goods.
On the other hand, because of slow disbursement
of other aid, at the end of a financial year Norway
would sometimes offer the recipient country addi-
tional commodity aid or import support in order to
better reach planned disbursements.
As many recipient countries introduced more lib-
eral import regimes, the operation of the 'tradi-
tional' or 'old' commodity import support became
even more difficult to implement. Many donors
started to supply funds to the foreign exchange
market, and Norwegian commodity import support
has also been following this example.
It is difficult to trace any particular policy behind
Norwegian commodity import support pro-
grammes. As for all other aid, the motivation for
providing it is to promote self-sustained growth and
development with particular emphasis on improv-
ing the living conditions of the poorest part of the
population in recipient countries. In some cases
commodity aid was used directly to reach particular
targets. One example is the supply of papers for
school books to India which did not have the
intended effect of supporting the Indian objective of
expanding free education in primary schools. An
evaluation in 1991 (IMTEC 1991) observed that the
Norwegian supply of paper is a straight grant to the
Government of India, without any educational con-
sequences. Similar observations were made on
other commodity import support programmes. In a
review of Norwegian evaluation studies covering
the period 1986-92 (Norbye 1994) it was stated:
Commodity aid is also shown to be a sector in
which most activities which we have looked at,
on balance have been performing negatively in
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terms of effectiveness (achievement of objec-
tives). But the conclusion is based on the way
the analysis has been undertaken. If we look at
commodity aid merely as a quick way of dis-
bursing balance of payments and budget sup-
port to the recipient governments, it has done
so Our assessment does not imply that com-
modity aid is an ineffective way of assisting a
country with balance of payments and/or bud-
getary problems, nor that Norwegian deliveries
have not taken place as planned, but it stresses
that the way in which it had been implemented,
was a poor instrument in order to achieve more
specific targets, in line with the main objectives
of Norwegian development cooperation.
In general, however, Norwegian commodity import
support was introduced in order to assist countries
in balance of payments difficulties with a form of
aid that was quicker to disburse, and which also
acted as direct balance of payments and budget
support. This certainly was the case in Bangladesh
in the late 1970s and in Tanzania around 1980. On
Tanzania Skarstein et al write (Skarstein 1988): 'By
1981, it had become meaningless to maintain tradi-
tional project aid at its attained level, because the
forex (foreign exchange) costs of operating new
projects could obviously not be covered by
Tanzania's export earnings. In this situation there
were two options; either to reduce foreign aid, or to
sWitch some part of total aid to balance of payments
support, budgetary support or CIS (commodity
import support) as ad hoc measures to provide some
relief in an untenable situation.'
The purchase by NORAD of goods to be delivered
under commodity assistance clearly favoured
Norwegian suppliers which eventually could estab-
lish markets in the recipient countries. This objec-
tive does not seem to have been met to any
considerable extent, as Norwegian enterprises have
not always been interested in doing so.
However, as Norway wanted to reach its poverty
oriented objectives, and commodity import support
clearly was not a satisfactory instrument to achieve
this goal, Norway has since the middle of the 1980s
sharply reduced its commodity aid and import sup-
port, as shown in Table 1 in which balance of pay-
ments support (and for 1994 also debt relief) are
expressed as percentage of total bilateral aid. Thus
in the course of 10 years the proportion of com-
modity import support has fallen dramatically; in
fact, in 1994 it corresponded only to 2 per cent of
the bilateral aid; the rest was debt relief.
In 1994 only two of the programme countries
received commodity import support: Zambia and
Zimbabwe. Zambia received a slightly higher
amount in debt relief, and two other programme
countries, Bangladesh and Nicaragua, also received
debt relief. 60 per cent of the debt relief went to five
non-programme countries or unspecified recipients.
3 Analysis of Evaluation
Methodology Adopted by Some
Evaluations and Project Reviews
Four evaluation reports and two projects reviews of,
mainly, Norwegian commodity import support
have been reviewed for the purpose of this paper
(Norbye 1986; Skarstein et al. 1988; Ofstad 1990;
Bhaduri et al. 1993; Hekland 1990; and Schreiner
1995). This section aims at a systematic analysis of
these reports.
Only one of the studies (Bhaduri et al. 1993) con-
tains a systematic attempt of macroeconomic analy-
sis; and as White points out (White 1994: 44), that
particular study was concerned with all aid, rather
than balance of payments support. In my opinion
this would not matter much, as significant changes
in the volume of aid in recent years have been
through changes in the volume of balance of pay-
ments support. This being said, most of the theoret-
ical analysis is not supported by any econometric
analysis and hence is somewhat speculative in
nature. The only results of regression analysis which
are presented in the, report show very strong links
between aid flows and investment; and between
increases in counterpart funds receipts to the gov-
ernment and the government budget deficit. The
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theoretical analysis shows inter alia that the aid
inflow has depressed demand for domestically pro-
duced goods. On that point I will make the obser-
vation that this development (which is supported by
empirical data) primarily is caused by the 'aid sup-
ported policy programme' which has led to a much
more liberal import regime. Hence the analysis stops
short of taking all relevant factors into account.
All studies deal with management of the commod-
ity import support programmes, and have various
recommendations as regards changes in proce-
dures, both on the part of the Norwegian donor and
also other donors, and by the recipient country
authorities. The management problem for the
donors becomes much simpler when the support is
channelled through the recipient's foreign exchange
market, and the remaining key problem is whether
the market is operated in a way which gives the
most efficient users of foreign exchange full access
to buy such exchange, inter aba by having equal
admission to credit facilities.
All four evaluations deal with what we may refer to
as microeconomic issues, viz, the impact of com-
modity import support on the firms or sectors
which have benefited from the use of this access to
foreign exchange. This was a major part of the ear-
lier evaluation of Tanzania (Skarstein et al. 1988),
and the survey material collected by that evaluation
team shows clearly that this microeconomic impact
had negative macroeconomic consequences
through the way in which manufacturing enter-
prises which did not save any foreign exchange
benefited from aid supplied foreign exchange. The
methodology applied was certainly appropriate
under the conditions which prevailed in Tanzania at
the time of the evaluation. This form of enquiry was
not followed up in the second evaluation of experi-
ence in Tanzania, but the team does point out that
Table 1 Norwegian balance of payments support
(as a per cent of total bilateral aid)
Note: * includes debt relief.
Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
24.9 23.4 17.3 18.2 9.4 16.7 12.0 8.0 5.6 8.2*
even under the new foreign exchange market
regime, less efficient enterprises appeared to have
easier access to import finance. The Bangladesh
study (Norbye 1986) did not study the perfor-
mance of enterprises that used inputs imported
under Norwegian commodity import support, but
was only concerned with whether the manufac-
tured products were of importance to the economy,
and concluded that this was the case. The study of
Mozambique (Ofstad 1990), however, also analyzed
the potential viability of some of the industrial sec-
tors that used Norwegian financed inputs, and
foünd a mixed picture. Neither of the two projects
reviews (Hekland 1990; and Schreiner 1995) dealt
with the microeconomic impact.
None of the evaluations and project reviews deal
directly or even implicitly with debt relief, and as
regards ongoing structural adjustment programmes
they are only dealt with marginally, except in
Bhaduri et al.
What can be learnt from these
evaluations about the economic
impact of balance of payments
support?
The way in which these evaluations and project
reviews have dealt with the commodity assistance
and import support programmes in Bangladesh,
Mozambique, Nicaragua and Tanzania implies that
not much systematic, if any, emphasis has been put
on the economic impact of commodity import sup-
port itself. The macroeconomic analysis in Bhaduri
et al (Bhaduri 1993) is the only exception, and its
treQtment of the impact of counterpart fund flows to
the government budget is of particular value. Their
conclusion is that this flow of funds has permitted
the Tanzanian government to follow a soft approach
to mobilization of domestic resources through aim-
ing at higher tax revenues, etc. However, if we
accept that the intention of foreign aid is to create
gaps, not to fill them, and that this might also apply
to government budgets, the conclusion is not quite
so evident. What is most important: to increase
expenditure in priority areas, and to plan realistic
ways in which later to increase government rev-
enues could be taken; or to aim at lessening the
dependence on foreign financing of government
expenditure in the short run? The evaluation may
be right in assuming that inflows of foreign funds
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have dampened the need for immediate mobiliza-
tion of domestic resources, but without a further
study of what has been done and what has been
aimed at, the conclusion may be too severe.
The second most important conclusion which can
be drawn from the evaluations, is to be found in the
earlier evaluation of the experience in Tanzania
(Skarstein 1988). It points out that firms that had
received Norwegian commodity import support,
were not net foreign exchange earners or savers, and
what is remarkable is that a sample of firms which
had not benefited from Norwegian aid on the con-
trary saved foreign exchange for the country. It
should be added that provision of aid must have had
other, positive effects, notably by keeping the firms
going and thus saving jobs and improving the firms'
financial position. However, the long term effects of
keeping economically inefficient firms going are
necessarily negative, unless the performance will
improve over time. Also in the Mozambique study
(Ofstad 1990) reference was made to the possible
misallocation of funds between individual potential
commodity import support recipients. The study
does not make any specific suggestion as to which
other enterprises might be more support worthy In
the case of many of the least developed countries it
might indeed be difficult to single out many well
qualified enterprises.
The change which has occurred recently in the dis-
tribution of commodity import support funds to
potential importers through a relatively free exchange
market should in principle mean that the firms
which are able to buy the foreign currency at the pre-
vailing rate and then either sell the imported goods
or process them and manage to sell their products
should be economically viable firms. Thus many of
the problems which earlier faced donors providing
commodity import support should disappear or at
least become less serious. This is the conclusion
drawn by Carlsson et al. (1994). But this depends on
the overall policy of the recipient countries.
Several of the studies indicate, at least implicitly,
that the fungibility of commodity aid necessarily
undermines efforts by individual donors to assure
that their commodity import support will allow
increased imports of precisely the goods which
donor and recipient government have agreed to use
the funds for. In the case of high priority goods, the
recipient country would have imported them in any
case, and the financing of the import of them,
releases foreign exchange to be used for imports of
other goods. Only when commodity import sup-
port is used to pay for imports of what the recipient
consider to be low priority goods, the donor can be
reasonably sure that its support in reality is used for
those specific goods. But in general donors do not
want to support low priority import.
The most interesting macroeconomic conclusion
drawn from these studies is the idea put forward in
the Bhaduri et al study of Tanzania (haduri 1993)
that commodity aid (above the level of 'absorptive
capacity' of the recipient country) actually can have
a negative impact on the gross domestic product by
squeezing out domestic production by imports.
White (White 1994) is sceptical to this hypothesis
which only will only be valid 'if consumption and
investment (in the recipient country) remain
unchanged,' and in his opinion this will not be so.
Bhaduri et al refer to the strong fall in market shares
of the domestic manufacturing industry and the
subsequent fall in manufacturing output as an indi-
cation of the validity of their hypothesis, but they
do not provide any data on the overall impact on
the economy For example, what has been the
impact of the counterpart funds generated by such
imports on government expenditure? The idea
expressed in the second Tanzania evaluation is fas-
cinating, but much more research must be done to
test its validity
The four countries in which Norwegian evaluations
and project reviews considered in this report have
been conducted, were all countries that suffered
from very serious balance of payments difficulties,
although these now are much less critical in
Bangladesh. But all of them depend clearly on com-
modity import support as an important part of bal-
ance of payments and budgetary support. All
studies point out more or less directly that the func-
tioning of the economies in these countries depend
on continued foreign aid of this type. Such aid can-
not be replaced by project aid in the short run.
Commodity import support can be disbursed suffi-
ciently quickly, and it is also so fungible that it
allows the recipient country to undertake essential
imports and through counterpart funds finance cru-
cial government expenditure: I will add that
whether it creates unnecessary aid dependence or
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not, both as regards financing of imports and of
government expenditure, will depend on future
developments. None of the four countries could
function properly without foreign aid for many
years ahead, but unless the dependence on aid in
relation to gross domestic product, imports and
government expenditure will start to fall, the hopes
for sustainable development may appear to be grim.
5 Conclusions
To evaluate the actual impact of total foreign aid on
the recipient's economy is in itself a complex task, and
the results of the studies that have been undertaken,
are controversial. The assignment and its results
become even more arguable if the intent is to assess its
consequences for specific economic sectors or popu-
lation groups. Non-project financial aid or commod-
ity import support or programme aid is mostly as
fungible as total aid, and therefore it is as difficult to
measure its effects on the economy as a whole or on
specific parts of the economy and the society as it is
to evaluate the consequences of total aid.
On the other hand aid donor countries and interna-
tional organizations will frequently aim at reaching
specific objectives when they grant non-project
financial aid to a recipient country. Consequently
evaluations of such aid have had to address the
question as to whether such specific objectives have
been met.
Initially most non-financial aid took the form of
commodity import support (CIS) which was con-
trolled in considerable detail by the donor organi-
zation. It was thérefore possible, at least in
principle, to assess the impact of aid financed
imports on certain economic sectors, on individual
enterprises, on the availability of individual com-
modities etc., and it is therefore not surprising that
early evaluations of CIS paid much attention to the
microeconomic results. In addition, since allocation
and purchase procedures were so important, evalu-
ations also dealt extensively with administrative
problems. However, even when the use of CIS was
subject to serious constraints, it was nevertheless
still a fungible form for aid because it released for-
eign exchange for use on other imports. Hence the
macroeconomic results of the CTS were important,
but very seldom addressed seriously in evaluations
of the 'traditional' CTS.
In more recent years CTS has been offered as an
inflow of foreign exchange which recipient couri-
tries can use for imports of a wide range of goods
from very different sources. This has made it
increasingly meaningless to try to measure its rela-
tions to very specific objectives, and therefore an
evaluation of its macroeconomic impact has
become essential. However, the most important
consequence of such basically untied CTS is linked
to the conditionality attached to it by many impor-
tant donors. Such conditionality is not concerned
with the use of the money for imports of certain
types of goods, but with changes in policies and
institutional arrangements in the recipient coun-
tries. Thus the evaluation has become increasingly
complex: it must also find out to what extent con-
ditions have been met, and if so which conse-
quences this has had on the economy and the
society as a whole.
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